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MOSES AND MODERNISM
Neil H. Cogan*
THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE COLONIAL AND R.E.VOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES. Edited by Patrick T.
Conley and John P. Kaminski. Madison: Madison House. 1992. Pp.
xxiii, 542. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $ 24.95.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES. By Jennifer Friesen. New York: Matthew
Bender. 1992. Looseleaf binder in one volume. $140.
REFERENCE GUIDES TO THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES. Westport: Greenwood Press. 1991-1994. Nineteen
volumes. $55-89.50.
And now, 0 Israel, give heed to the laws and norms which I am instructing you to observe, so that you may thrive and be able to occupy
the land that the Lord, the God of your fathers, is giving you. You shall
not add anything to what I command you or take anything away from it,
but keep the commandments of the Lord your God that I enjoin upon
you. 1
I warn everyone who hears the words of the prophecy of this book; if
anyone adds to these words, God will add to him the plagues described
in this book; and if anyone takes away from the words of the book of this
prophecy, God will take away his share in the tree oflife and in this holy
city, which are described in this book. 2

I.

FORMS OF MOSAIC FuNDAMENTAL LAW

Abraham, not Moses, gave us monotheism.
Moses gave us fundamental law - its forms at least, if not much of
its content as well. The forms rule us, not from the grave, but from
ever-pregnant texts that shape our beliefs about fundamental law. The
recent spate of books on state constitutional law and the prominent
criticism of the need for such law prompt this essay about the forms of
fundamental law.
Mosaic fundamental law, set forth in the Five Books of Moses in
such texts as the Ten Commandments and the Mosaic Codes, provides
* Dean, Quinnipiac College School of Law. Dipl. 1964, Gratz College; B.A. 1966, LL.B.
1969, University of Pennsylvania. - Ed. This essay is dedicated to my father, Jacob Cogan,
zikhrono le-o/am.
1. Deuteronomy 4:1-2, in THE TORAH, THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES 330 (Jewish Publication
Socy. 1962) [hereinafter THE TORAH].
2. 38 THE ANCHOR BIBLE: REVELATION 22:18 (J. Massyngberde Ford ed., 1975).
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the covenantal duties of the people to the Sovereign God and to one
another. According to the story related in the texts, God transmitted
fundamental law at Sinai through Moses to the people; 3 the law is
founded in truth and expressive of justice. Mosaic fundamental law is
distinguished from other Israelite laws, norms, and practices not discussed in the biblical texts, such as those governing hereditary succession and commercial law, that were in effect prior to and
contemporaneously with the transmission of fundamental law but that
God did not prescribe in depth and detail. 4
On the face of the texts, the form of Mosaic fundamental law conforming to the Sinaitic story is ostensibly as follows: The law is not
withheld, hidden, or discretionary; it is express. Typically, it is not
general, vague, or ambiguous; it is specific and intended to be clear.
Although delivered orally at first, it is then written. 5
There is no other fundamental law; it is exclusive. The law comes
from a central, high authority - God; it is descendent. God's law
trumps other laws, norms, and practices; it is supreme.
Finally, the law does not change, being neither added to nor subtracted from; it is fixed. 6 The law, too, does not cease with the death
of Moses or any other prophet or leader; it is enduring, indeed
etemal. 7
We may rightfully term the form of fundamental law conforming
to the Sinaitic story as "the static form." The more express, specific,
and written the law, the less judges can add or subtract. The more
exclusive, centralized, and supreme the law, the less other laws,
norms, and practices can cause it to progress. Plainly, the more law
depends upon ancient revelation, the less competing law can arise.
3. "And this is the Instruction - the laws and the norms - that the Lord your God has
commanded [me] to impart to you •..•" Deuteronomy 6:1, in THE TORAH, supra note 1, at 336.
4. See NAHUM M. SARNA, EXPLORING EXODUS: THE HERITAGE OF BIBLICAL ISRAEL
170-71 (1986); MICHAEL FISHBANE, BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION IN ANCIENT ISRAEL 91
(1985). It is noteworthy that prior to the transmission of the Ten Commandments and any of the
Mosaic Codes, Moses sat as a judge to settle disputes. See Exodus 18:13-26, in THB TORAH,
supra note 1, at 131-32.
5. "When He finished speaking with him on Mount Sinai, He gave Moses the two tablets of
the Pact, stone tablets inscribed with the finger of God." Exodus 31:18, in THE TORAH, supra
note 1, at 157.
"And the Lord said to Moses: Write down these commandments, for in accordance with
these commandments I make a covenant with you and with Israel." Exodus 34:27, in THB TORAH, supra note 1, at 163.
6. This characteristic, described in the opening quotation, continued into Talmudic discourse. Rabbi Meir said, "My son, be careful, because thy work is the work of Heaven; if thou
omittest a single letter or addest a single letter, thou dost as a consequence destroy the whole
world." BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Sotah 20a.
7. For a comparison of Roman "ethical rules" with Biblical "categorical injunctions," see
DAVID DAUBE, FORMS OF ROMAN LEGISLATION 62-64 (1956) ("[T]he Roman percept is Wisdom, instruction, conservative, the Biblical, the Will of God, adjuration, revolutionary."); for a
comparison of Roman, Old Testament, and New Testament forms, see DAVID DAUBB, The
Form Is the Message, in ANCIENT JEWISH LAW 71 (1981).
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The Sinaitic story, however, is not all there is. Modem critical
Bible scholarship argues that the Five Books of Moses include texts of
several writers or groups of writers, such as the J (Jahwist), E (Elohistic), D (Deuteronomistic), and P (Priestly) writers; JE, the historiographer of J and E; and R, the redactor of JE, D, and P. 8 These writers
wrote during the course of more than five centuries and in several
communities within the Kingdom of Israel, the Kingdom of Judah,
and the Transjordan. 9
The texts of these writers differ in many respects. They differ in
language and style. They differ in their narrative of events from the
Creation to the death of Moses. Most important, for our concerns,
they differ remarkably at times about the form, content, and validity of
laws, norms, and practices. to
For example, P, perhaps more so than other writers, used words
more general than specific, such as in God's commandments to Israel
to be a holy people: "You shall not coerce your neighbor.... You
shall not insult the deaf . . . . You shall not render an unfair decision
. . . . You shall not hate your kinsman in your heart.... Love your
neighbor as yourself ...." 11 In addition, each of the writers, but P
and D in particular, differs as to such rights as property in women,
children, and slaves and such religious duties as tithing. 12 Each of the
writers presents us with significantly differing corpora of the fundamental law governing Israel in its covenant with God.
These differing texts were redacted within one sacred document,
known as the Five Books of Moses, and they were canonized. 13 This
redaction is remarkable, given the ostensibly static form of fundamental law. It is simply remarkable that a text expressing the covenant
between a people and its one God would allow such differences.
A likely explanation is that while the form of Mosaic fundamental
law conforming to the Sinaitic story is presented in what appears to be
a static form, much of that law was in fact the product of what we may
8. See generally RICHARD ELLIOTI FRIEDMAN, WHO WROTE THE BIBLE? (1989). D is
typically described as two writers, Dtr 1 and Dtr 2• Other writers include Hand T. The writers
described in the text and in this footnote authored not only parts of the Five Books of Moses but
parts of the books of the Hebrew Bible through Second Kings.
9. See 4A THE ANCHOR BIBLE: NUMBERS 1-20, at 48-84 (Baruch A. Levine ed., 1993)
(discussing different sources in the Book of Numbers); YEHEZKEL KAUFMANN, THE RELIGION
OF lsRAEL 153-211 (M. Greenberg ed. & trans., abr. ed. 1960).
10. See 5 THE ANCHOR BIBLE: DEUTERONOMY 1-11, at 19-35 (Moshe Weinfeld ed., 1991)
[hereinafter DEUTERONOMY]; KAUFMANN, supra note 9, at 166-72.
11. See Leviticus 19, in THE TORAH, supra note l, at 216-18. It may be that H, a writer in
his or her own regard, and also a redactor of P, is responsible for these general words. See
ISRAEL KNOHL, THE SANCTUARY OF SILENCE: A STUDY OF THE PRIESfLY STRATA IN THE
PENTATEUCH 11-16, 70 (1992) (in Hebrew).
12. See DEUTERONOMY, supra note 10, at 19-35; KAUFMANN, supra note 9, at 166-72.
13. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 217-33. Friedman suggests that Ezra was the redactor.
Id. at 218, 223-33.
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rightfully term "a progressive form" of lawmaking. Modem critical
Bible scholarship informs us that the texts of J, E, D, P, and others
reflected a crystallization of understandings and traditions that had
evolved over cenBitles and that had been influenced by the transmission of differing texts, by contact with differing Israelite and non-Israelite tribes and peoples, and by the differing influences of political,
economic, and social events within the region. 14 The scholarship informs us, too, that the evolution and influences notwithstanding, each
set of understandings and traditions was considered divinely transmitted, certainly at the time of its crystallization and no doubt through
the process of evolution as wen.1s
Thus, when R, the redactor, set to work, he or she had the combined text of JE and the texts of D and P, each fixed and divinely
transmitted. Each had much in common with the other - the covenant between the people and God and the structure of Mosaic fundamental law - but each differed from the other, too, even regarding the
content and wording of the Ten Commandments.
As best we know, R edited the narrative accounts of JE, D, and P
into the wonderful narratives we now have. But he or she left the legal
corpora of the writers intact, despite their significant differences. 16
The redactor did so, I suggest, because each set of legal texts did adhere to the same concept of covenant and to the same structure of
Mosaic fundamental law, and because each set of legal texts did assert
divine transmission. Under these circumstances, no set could be ignored or discarded, or even revised.
R thus left us with an example - a inost influential example - of
a people who were given, who were able to accept, and who thrived for
fifteen centuries on a text that combined at least three differing accounts of fundamental law.17
II.

MOSAIC FORMS IN STATE AND FEDERAL FUNDAMENTAL
LAW

Both the static and progressive forms of Mosaic fundamental law
influenced the framers of American constitutions and documents even the positivists among them, for whom Reason had replaced
God. 18 This is not to gainsay the influence of the natural law philoso14. See MORTON SMITH, PALESTINIAN PARTIES AND POLITICS THAT SHAPED THE OLD
TESTAMENT 11-42 (1971).
15. See KAUFMANN, supra note 9, at 172; FISHBANE, supra note 4, at 277 (noting that each
tradition had "an auth_oritative, even divine, status").
16. See id. at 166.
17. On the Jewish concern with history, see YOSEF HAYIM YERUSHALMI, ZAKHOR: JEWISH
HISrORY AND JEWISH MEMORY (1982); YOSEF HAYIM YERUSHALMI, FREUD'S MOSES 19-35
(1991).
18. The static and progressive forms influenced English and other lawmakers, too. See, e.g.,
MAGNA CARTA chs. 39 ("No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or
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phers, English lawm~ers, and the Hebr~w and Christian Bibles upon
the content of American fundamental law. The influence of the Five
Books of Moses on the form of American fund·amental law, however,
is both important in fact and useful for anruysis. .
On their face, the forms of American constitutions and documents
relating to fundamental law have many of t4e characteristics of the
static Mosaic form. They are written, express, and specific:19 They
are explicitly fundamental20 and - within their jurisdictions supreme.21 This is not surpri~ing because American fundamental law
began with the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, its form reflecting the
strong influence of the Mosaic Codes. 22 American fundamental law
continued with Penn's Laws Agreed Upon in England, its form influenced by both the Hebrew and Christian Bibles.23
The reality of American fundamental law, however, is that the progressive Mosaic form has been dominant. Thus, although there are
state and federal constitutions and bills and declarations of rights in
written form, many refer directly or indirectly to or assume the existence of natural rights not written in the texts. 24 Although the texts are
exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judg[]ment
of his peers or by the law of the land."), 40 ("To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or
delay right or justice."), reprinted in J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA app. 6, at 461 (2d ed. 1992).
19. See Bradley Chapin, Written Rights: Puritan and Quaker Procedural Guarantees, 114
PA. MAG. HISr. & BIOGRAPHY 323 (1990).
Christ fulfilled the prophecy of Isaiah and Joel by promising to "write my law in their
hearts." Even so, biblical texts contained "subordinate, secondary, and declaratory" rules
that illuminated the rule which was "the eternal precepts of the spirit." The Quakers committed themselves to definite written law, because statutes acted as guides to the consciences
of witnesses and jurors by illuminating Christian equity.
Id. at 327 (quoting WILLIAM PENN, A DISCOURSE OF THE GENERAL RULE OF FAITH AND
PRACTICE, AND JUDGE OF CONTROVERSIE 21, 25 (London, T. Sowle 1699)).
20. "[T]he charter ofliberties ..•. is hereby declared and approved, and shall be for ever held
for fundamental in the government thereof ...." William Penn, Laws Agreed Upon in England.
in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 216, 216 (Richard L. Perry & John c. Cooper eds., 1959).
21. The free fruition of such liberties Immunities and priveledges as humanitie, Civilitie,
and Christianitie call for as due to every man in his place and proportion without impeachment and Infringement hath ever bene and ever will be the tranquillitie and Stabilitie of
Churches and Commonwealths. And the deniall or deprivall thereof, the disturbance if not
the ruine of both.
Nathaniel Ward, Massachusetts Body of Liberties, pmbl. (1641), in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 20, at 148, 148.
22. See GEORGE L. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETIS: A
STUDY IN TRADmON AND DESIGN 124-31 (1960); A.E. DICK HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM
RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 35-37 (1968).
23. See Chapin, supra note 19, at 3?4-29.
24. E.g.• U.S. CONST. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); MASS. CoNST. pt. 1,
art. I ("All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable
rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining
their safety and happiness."); see HADLEY ARKES;BEYOND THE CoNSTITUTION 58-80 (1990);
cf. MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CoNSTITUTION 25-30 (1987)
(stating that the Federalists embraced the Lockean idea of natural rights); Suzanna Sherry, The
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express, most - if not all - assume or refer to principles such as
judicial review and separation of powers. As is well known, just as the
progressive Mosaic form uses words such as love andfair, so American
fundamental texts often use words that are not specific but invitingly
- or irritatingly - open-ended. 25
More importantly, just as English lawmakers before them, so
American Framers were familiar with centuries-old arguments, renewed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, that the Five
Books of Moses must have been written by authors in addition to or
other than Moses. 26 While they may not have been familiar as yet
with J, E, D, P, JE, and R, the Framers were aware that the sacred
text contained a variety of versions of fundamental law, inconsistent in
important respects and worded variously. The acceptable variousness
of fundamental law in the Bible was a significant concept in the mind
of American Framers, leading them to believe, and to act upon the
belief, that each community's insight into natural law and the rights of
Englishmen was worthy of respect.
Thus, it is entirely unsurprising that the Massachusetts Body of
Liberties, the Laws Agreed Upon in England, and such important subsequent texts as the Virginia Declaration of Rights were in variance
with one another. Nor is it surprising that state constitutions and
state constitutional construction have borrowed from other state constitutions and constructions whatever is fitting and comfortable and
have rejected whatever is not. And it is not surprising that the national set of fundamental laws is bound together only by what is fundamental to the American scheme of justice.
Moreover, American fundamental law is both ascendent and descendent, not flXed. The people have ratified the texts of federal and
state constitutions and are continually revising them. The Federal
Constitution has been amended twenty-seven times; Congress proposed each amendment, which state legislatures then ratified. By contrast, most state constitutions have been amended more often,
frequently with amendments originated by local groups, associations,
and communities, and the people have ratified them directly.
Thus, the reality of American fundamental law is that its form has
typically been more progressive than static. Like the Five Books of
Early Virginia Tradition of Extratextua/ Interpretation, in TOWARD A USABLE PAsr: LIBERTY
UNDER STATE CoNSTITUTIONS 157 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991).
25. "Every person within this Jurisdiction, whether Inhabitant or forreiner shall enjoy the
same justice and law, that is generitll for the plantation, which we constitute and execute one
towards another without partialitie or delay." Ward, supra note 21, at 148.
26. Ever since the canonization of the Bible, there have been prominent critics of Moses'
authorship of the Five Books of Moses, including such figures as Spinoza. Contemporary critics
include THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 415-27 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Penguin Books 1968)
(1651); and JEAN AsTR.uc, CONJECTURES SUR LES MEMOIRES ORIGINAUX: DONT IL PARAIT
QUE MOYSE S'EST SERVI POUR COMPOSER LE LIVRE DE LA GENESE •.• (1753).
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Moses, there are differing traditions within communities, namely, the
states. Nonetheless, like the Five Books of Moses, there is broad adherence to certain basic rules and principles, such as the fundamental
aspects of due process, the floor below which no state goes.
Until now, these have been the forms of fundamental law in the
United States. The law, the literature, and most importantly the people have assumed it. Until now, too, there has been little dissent to the
arrangement, however unstudied.

III.

THE LITERATURE OF PROGRESSIVE STATE FUNDAMENTAL
LAW

The legal literature of state fundamental law was, but is no longer,
sparse. This is due in part to a new realization by lawyers and judges
that the form of most state fundamental law is progressive rather than
static, and also to an awakening within many communities that state
fundamental law may be revised by amendment as well as construction. To put it crassly, there is now movement in state constitutional
law, and there is now a market for books about the movement.
Recent publications include collections of papers, 27 surveys, 28
teaching materials,29 and a practitioners' treatise. 30 The Bill of Rights
and the States, edited by Patrick T. Conley31 and John P. Kaminski, 32
deserves special recognition for the excellence of its scholarship. It
collects essays on the development of fundamental law through the
eighteenth century in each of fourteen original states. Each essay ends
with a comprehensive bibliography of a state's fundamental law, and
the collection concludes with a comprehensive bibliographic essay on
the Federal Bill of Rights (pp. 461-514). The book is invaluable for
anyone studying American fundamental law, both state and federal.
Professor Jennifer Friesen's State Constitutional Law 33 deserves
special recognition, too. Besides being the one and only practitioners'
treatise on developments in state fundamental law in each state, it is
clearly written, well organized, and comprehensive. It is a vital resource for any practitioner contemplating rights litigation.
27. See, e.g.• PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF STATE CONSfITUTIONALISM (Barbara Wolfson ed., 1993); TOWARD A USABLE PASf, supra note 24.
28. See, e.g.• EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSfITUTIONAL LAW (Gerald. E. Weiss ed.,
1991); Fourth Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 723 (1992).
29. JOHN E. COOPER & THOMAS C. MARKS, JR., FLORIDA C0NsrITUTIONAL LAW (1992);
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE C0NSfITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1993).
30. JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE C0NSfITUTIONAL LAW:' LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES (1993).
31. Professor Emeritus and Lecturer in History, Providence College. Mr. Conley is also a
practicing attorney.
32. Director, Center for the Study of the American Constitution at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
33. Jennifer Friesen is Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.
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Of most moment, Greenwood Press has committed itself to publishing Reference Guides to the State Constitutions, a series of one-volume guides to each of the fifty state constitutions, and has to date
published nineteen of the Guides. 34 The Guides' authors ably summarize the constitutional history of each state, synopsize most provisions
of the constitution in force, and provide bibliographic sources not
found elsewhere. Nowhere else can lawyers and scholars find a compact summary of each state's fundamental law. The Guides, too, are
an important resource for the growing body of lawyers who do state
constitutional litigation and a valuable educational aid for the many
lawyers who want to do such litigation.
Both The Bill of Rights and the States and the Guides discuss the
particularity and specialness of each state's fundamental law, and
Friesen's State Constitutional Law does so both by state and by groups
of states. The Guides and State Constitutional Law assume, correctly,
that each state has a diverse set of groups, associations, and communities and its own particular set of texts and historical memories and
that, as a result, the states may genuinely differ even as to aspects of
fundamental law. Although none of the authors asserts that each state
is unique in each and every aspect of fundamental law, they nonetheless rightly assume that there may be many particulars in which a state
differs from other states and that these differences are important.
Where there are no differences, the books say so.
Although there are no discussions of form beyond references to
principles of federalism, the Guides and State Constitutional Law understand that there is a basic minimum of liberty, equality, and fairness applicable to each state. Each understands, too, that beyond the
basic minimum each state may develop its own tradition of heightened
protection.
IV.

MODERNIST CRmcs OF PROGRESSIVE STATE FUNDAMENTAL
LAW

Several critics, two of whom are discussed below, reject the contin-

c.

34. JOHN D. LESHY, THE ARIZONA STATE CoNSTITUTION (1993); KAY
Goss, THE
ARKANSAS STATE CoNSTITUTION (1993); JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., THE CALIFORNIA STATE
CoNSTITUTION (1993); WESLEY W. HORTON, THE CoNNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTION
(1993); TALBOT D'ALEMBERTE, THE FLORIDA STATE CONSTITUTION (1991); ANNE F. LEE,
THE HAWAII STATE CONSTITUTION {1993); DONALD CROWLEY & FLORENCE HEFFRON, THE
IDAHO STATE CoNSTITUTION (1994); FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE KANSAS STATE CONSTITU·
TION {1992); LEE HARGRAVE, THE LoUISIANA STATE CONSTITUTION (1991); MARSHALL J.
TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CoNSTITUTION (1992); JOHN W. WINKLE III, THE MISSISSIPPI
STATE CONSTITUTION {1993); ROBERT D. MIEWALD & PETER J. LoNGO, THE NEBRASKA
STATE CONSTITUTION {1993); MICHAEL W. BOWERS, THE NEVADA STATE CONSTITUTION
{1993); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW JERSEY STATE CoNSTITUTION (1990); PETER J.
GALIE, THE NEW YORK STATE CoNSTITUTION (1991); JOHN V. ORTH, THE NORTH CARO·
LINA STATE CoNSTITUTION {1993); LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE ST.,_TE CONSTITUTION
(1990); WILLIAM C. HILL, THE VERMONT STATE CoNSTITUTION (1992); ROBERT B. KEITER &
TIM NEWCOMB, THE WYOMING STATE CoNSTITUTION (1993).
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uing validity of the forms of American fundamental law and the value
of the literature discussed above. They argue that there is no need for
a progressive state fundamental law. One critic argues, for example,
that the states should abandon the field to the national government. 35
Another argues that the role of the states is to contribute to an American constitutionalism. - a set of national rights to liberty, equality,
and fairness. 36 Each; in his own way, argues for an exclusive national
fundamental law, and each assumes that this national fundamental
law has no need of differing state fundamental law.
A.

The Argument for No State Fundamental Law

Professor James Gardner's article, The Failed Discourse of State
Constitutionalism, 31 has two parts: an empirical part arguing that
state constitutional law discourse and, in effect, state constitutional
law have failed; and a political part arguing that state constitutional
law ought to fail.
In the empirical part, Gardner examines 254 appellate opinions reported for 1990 from seven states - California, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, and Virginia - in which
the state's highest court arguably decided a state constitutional law
issue. 38 After examination, Gardner finds that the exemplar state constitutional law opinions are "confusing, conflicting, and essentially
unintelligible. " 3 9
Comparing the discourse in these state decisions to federal constitutional law discourse, he finds, with only a handful of exceptions, no
distinct discussion of "text, framers' intent, constitutional theory, judicial precedent, and societal values."40 Gardner concludes from these
findings that "the failure of state courts to develop a coherent discourse of state constitutional law - that is, a language in which it is
possible for participants in the legal system to make intelligible claims
about the meaning of state constitutions" - is the primary reason for
the kinds of state constitutional law opinions he found. 41
I have discussed elsewhere some of the empirical weaknesses of
Gardner's approach. 42 Gardner's snapshot of state constitutionalism
- aIJ. examination of seven states during one calendar year - fails to
35. James A. Gardner, 11te Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. R.Ev.
761 (1992).
36. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1147 (1993).
37. Gardner, supra note 35.
38. Id. at 780 n.68.
39. Id. at 763.
40. Id. at 778.
41. Id. at 763-64, 804.
42. Neil H. Cogan, In Praise of Diverse Discourse, 5 ST. THOMAS L. R.Ev. 173 (1992).
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take into account that state constitutionalism was dormant until the
1970s and that federal constitutional provisions such as the Privileges
or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses took far
longer for commentators to develop into an intelligible discourse following their dormancy. The snapshot fails to discuss subject areas,
such as privacy and equality, in which state courts and state constitutional amendments have made significant developments. The snapshot also fails to give adequate consideration to the absence, until
recently, of a significant literature for practitioners and students. A
more complete reading of state judicial decisionmaking would show, I
have argued,43 that state fundamental law discourse is as intelligent as
federal fundamental law discourse.
In addition, because of his concentration on judicial decisionmaking, Gardner misses - as does Paul Kahn, the other critic examined
here - the discourse in groups, associations, and communities as they
seek to revise and amend state constitutions. He misses the fact that
much of the movement in state constitutionalism results from initiatives respecting such rights as the right to privacy and the rights of
women, the physically handicapped, and victims of crime.
In the political part of his article, Gardner argues that reliance
upon state constitutional law adjudication for the protection of fundamental rights is not simply ill-founded but actually dangerous to the
protection of those rights. He argues that reliance on state decisionmaking undermines our national identity and the role of the U.S. Constitution as the embodiment of our national values. 44 Thus, Gardner
urges reliance on federal constitutional law adjudication - and its
paradigm of discourse - for the protection of fundamental rights, and
he even supports - but does not now urge - the eventual demise of
state constitutions and the states along with them. 45
This argument misses the significant concept taught by Mosaic
fundamental law, as well as by our own history: namely, that a nation
may have an identity, de".elop national values, and have fundamental
laws and principles in common, while nonetheless tolerating within
communities and regions differing understandings and traditions and
even different fundamental laws, norms, and practices. There need not
be one law respecting speech in shopping centers, if some states wish
to expand speech beyond the federal minimum of protection. There
need not be one law regarding the disabled, if some states wish to expand protection beyond the federal minimum of protection. The na43. See id. at 175-76.
44. See Gardner, supra note 35, at 823-30.
45. Id. Gardner assumes, of course, that federal fundamental law no longer has any need to
refer to or incorporate state fundamental law. See id. at 770-78 (asserting that federal constitutionalism is superior to and should be a model for state discourse).
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tion is better for the federal minimum, and the nation is better for the
communities committed to expanded freedom.
B.

The Argument for Participation in American Fundamental Law

Professor Paul Kahn's recent article, Interpretation and Authority
in State Constitutionalism, 46 rejects a state constitutionalism premised
on "unique state sources," that is, on "the text of the state constitution, the history of its adoption and application, ana the unique, historically identifiable qualities of the state community."47 Although
Kahn does not expressly assert that there are no such unique state
sources, he does argue that there no longer are vibrant state communities - at least none that can become the source for vibrant state constitutionalism. He argues further that even if there were such
communities, state constitutionalism unique to each would be inconsistent with trends in American constitutionalism and interpretative
debate.
Kahn's assessment of state communities lacks rigor. Although he
does not purport to present an empirically sound and complete assessment in his article, his dismissal of the vibrancy of state communities
deserves analysis and, if appropriate, rejection.
Kahn begins his essay by disparaging local public life and lauding
national public life. People no longer feel constrained by the authority
of local associations, such as the "church, family, town, local militia,
unions, schools, and political parties," he declares.48 "These traditional forms of local association have come to be seen as nothing more
than the products of individual choice."49 Similarly, state and local
communities are only the aggregate of those individuals who choose to
reside in a particular area. "Local public life is now often identified
with prejudice, discrimination, censorship, and ideological rigidity." 50
By contrast, "[m]odem constitutional law ... has generally focused on
establishing national political authority."51 "The individual citizen
turns to the national government for protection from these constraints
on his or her freedom." 52
Kahn's cited empirical basis for these arguments is a series of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions, announced between 1962 and 1980.53 These
decisions, in which an individual's liberty claim prevailed against a
local community or association, assertedly support Kahn's argument
46.
47.
48.
49.

SO.
51.
52.
53.

Kahn, supra note 36.
Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1148-49 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 1149.
Id.
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1148-49.
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about the decline of authority. But he cites no decision or scholarly
research to support his argument about the perceived decline of vitality or value. Nor does Kahn cite any basis for his ultimate disparagement of local public life: the suggestion that many identify local
communities "with prejudice, discrimination, censorship, and ideological rigidity."S 4
The decline in authority and the perceived decline in vitality or
value will continue, he argues, because so many persons experience
national military service, move across state and local boundaries, and
receive information, ideas, art, and literature from beyond the community. ss Kahn concludes that, accordingly, "[a] vibrant state constitutionalism must be founded on something other than anachronistic
beliefs about state sovereignty as an expression of state differences."S 6
Not only do Kahn's arguments lack empirical support, they make
assumptions about the decline of groups, associations, and communities that are simply wrong. Although some structures that were once
powerful have weakened considerably, such as city political machines
and union .locals, others are replacing them. These new structures,
from citizen anticrime groups to women's and gay-lesbian coalitions,
have and exercise power locally. These groups act within their communities, help shape locaj understandings, and actively push for
change - often fundamental change.
Next,s7 Kahn argues that constitutionalism is an interpretive enterprise that is not bound to a single truth or set of truths. ss He argues
further that the interpretive enterprise in the United States has sought
for two centuries to reconcile the nation's commitment to a rule of law
- undergirded by the values of equality, liberty, and due process and its commitment to rule by the majority.s9 Constitutional text, to
the extent that it is of "constitutional dimension ... is interpreted in
light of the larger constitutional commitment to liberty, equality, and
due process, as well as an understanding of the meaning of representative government."60
Kahn would enlist state j1:1dges into this American interpretive enterprise. "The effort of each [state] judge should be to construct the
best interpretation of equality [or liberty or due process] of which he
54. Id. at 1149.
55. See id. at 1149-50 (citing U.S. Supreme Court decisions and James Madison).
56. Id. at 1150.
57. Before making the next argument described in the text, Kahn criticizes Justice William
Brennan's support of state constitutional decisionmaking as "not an acknowledgment of a vibrant, state-centered c:Ommunity life, but rather an attempt to enlist the states in the liberal
project of defending the individual against authority." Id. at 1151.
58. See id. at 1156-58; see also PAUL W. KAHN, LEGmMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1992).
59. See Kahn, supra note 36, at 1153-59.
60. Id. at 1159.
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or she is capable." 61 Remarkably, he believes that the state judge is
not bound to his or her state's texts, traditions, and history. He argues
that "[t]he inquiry might turn to any number of texts, precedents, or
historical events, as well as moral intuitions and· principled arguments. "62 "We distort this process if we conc~ive of it as an effort to
put into place a loc~ community's unique concept of equality [or liberty or due process], instead of the constitutional goal of equality [or
liberty or due process] that is a common aspiration of American
.
.
lifie. ·~
Not only does Kahn miss the legal mandate imposed upon judges
by their oaths of office and the historical teaching discussed above, but
he misses the broad landscape of state constitutionalism. Although
liberty, equality, and fairness may encompass the world of constitutional law, Kahn misses the point that many developments of state
constitutional law will not be part of the Federal Constitution for
years, decades, or longer, if at all. If they will not be part of the Federal Constitution, then the enterprise of an American constitutional
law is tilting at windmills.
As I show below, 64 the p·eople by their own initiative have· protected women and men more in some states than the national government is likely to do for quite some time. The 'protection of privacy at
the state level, for example, is years ahead of federal constitutional
law. Protection of access to courts and protection of victims appear to
be topics that the federal judiciary may not address on its own.
Both Gardner and Kahn conceive of "modernism" as in part a
movement away from local power to national power and away from
local identity to national identity. Without conceding that this is an
accurate description of social reality, I suggest that the forms of
Mosaic fundamental law as understood by modern critical Bible scholarship are as modern, and as influential, today as they were twenty-five
hundred years ago. Modern fundamental law is a mixture of basic
national rights and broad national values with sometimes differing and
more protective local rights and values.
V.

PROGRESSIVE STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM

A brief overview of several developing state constitutional issues
shows that both Gardner's and Kahn's theories are challenged by the
distinctiveness of local development. The overview begins with rights
to equality, protected specifically under state and federal constitutions,
and then proceeds to rights to privacy, rights of access to courts, and
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1161.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 70-90 and acci>mpanying text.
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rights of victims, all of which are protected specifically under state
constitutions and - to an increasingly lesser extent, if at all - under
the Federal Constitution.
A. Equality, a Right Specially Protected Under Federal and Most
State Constitutions
In the Federal Constitution, protections for equality derive principally from the Equal Protection Clause. Among the states, by contrast, there are four categories of language, some of them more
specifically protective and some more broadly protective of equality
than the federal provision. 6s
The first category of language, found in thirteen states, is similar to
that of the federal provision. 66 A second category of language, by contrast with equal protection language, prohibits the award of special
privileges or immunities to persons and classes and appears in sixteen
state constitutions. 67 A third category of language, used in at least six
states, does not grant equal protection but instead guarantees equality
of rights in general language. 68 A fourth category of language protects
equality in class-specific language and appears in twenty-three state
constitutions, including eighteen that use gender-specific clauses. 69
The class-specific protections exceed federal constitutional protection. For example, Florida specifically prohibits denials of equality on
the basis of physical handicap, 70 while the Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal Constitution to give very little protection against
65. Friesen ably 'discusses these provisions, and the text of this review owes much to her
discussion. See FRIESEN, supra note 30, para. 3.01.
66. CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 7(a); CoNN. CONST. art. I, § 20; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2;
HAW. CoNST. art. I,§ S; ILL. CoNST. art. I,§ 2; LA. CONST. art. I,§ 3; ME. CONST. art. I,§ 6A; MICH. CONST. art. I,§ 2; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. II,§ 18; N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 11; N.C. CoNST. art. I, § 19; S.C. CoNST. art. I, § 3.
67. See ALA. CoNST. art. I, § 22; ARIZ. CoNST. art. II, § 13; ARK. CONST. art. II, § 18; CAL.
CoNST. art. I, § 7(b); CoNN. CoNST. art. I, § l; IND. CONST. art. I, § 23; IOWA CONST. art. I,
§ 6; KY. CoNST. § 3; N.C. CoNST. art. I, § 32; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 21; OR. CONST. art. I,§ 20;
S.D. CoNST. art. VI, § 18; TEX. CoNST. art. I, § 3; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. VII; VA. CONST. art. I,
§ 4; WASH. CoNST. art. I, § 12.
68. See FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 2; KAN. CoNST. Bill of Rights § 1; KY. CONST. §§ 1, 3; Mo.
CoNST. art. I, § 2; Tux. CoNST. art. I, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 2. Some of these states, in
addition to general protective language, have class-specific protection in either the same or another section of their constitutions. See infra note 69. Other states combine this general Ian·
guage with a specific equal protection grant. See, e.g., ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; MICH. CONST.
art. I, §§ 1, 2.
69. See ALASKA CoNST. art. I, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29;
CoNN. CoNST. art. I,§ 20; FLA. CONST. art. I,§ 2; HAW. CONST. art. I,§§ S, 21; ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 18; LA. CoNST. art. I, § 3; ME. CONST. art. I, § 6-A; Mo. CONST. art. XXXXVI; MASS.
CoNST. pt.'1, art. I; MONT. CONST. art. II,§ 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. II; N.J. CONST. art. I,
§ S; N.M. CoNST. art. II, § 18; N.Y. CONST. art. I,§ 11; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19; PA. CONST.
art. I,§ 26; TEX. CoNST. art. I,§ 3a; UTAH CONST. art. IV,§ l; VA. CONST. art. I,§ 11; WASH.
CoNST. art. XXXI, § 1; WYO. CoNST. art. I, § 3, art. VI, § 1.
70. FLA. CoNST. art. I, § 2.
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such discrimination. 71 Texas coilrts have interpreted its equal rights
amendment to give out-of-wedlock fathers parity with mothers in legitimation actions, 72 in contrast to federal law.73 Washington courts
have interpreted that state's equal rights amendment to prohibit gender discrimination, not simply to subject such discrimination to strict
scrutiny; thus, they applied the amendment to strike down a rule bar,ring girls froni playing on a high school football team. 74
Even when state language is the same as or similar to federal language, su9h as California's equal protection language, state protection
exceeds· federal protection. California is an example of a state in
which the courts have interpreted equal protection language more
broadly than the federal courts, though Californians have voted to
keep equal protection in one area at the federal floor. The California
courts have protected homosexuals against employment discrimination75 and have accepted statistical proof of disparate impact against
women as sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. 76 The California courts
had also held that both de facto and de jure school discrimination violate the state equal protection clause,77 but the people by ballot have
limited the reach of the state clause to that of the federal clause in
school cases. 7ir
B. Privacy, a Right Generally Protected Under the Federal
Constitution and Specifically Protected Under Many State
Constitutions

There is no specific protection of privacy under the Federal Constitution. The federal courts have, however, given some protection to
privacy interests under the Due Process Clauses. 79 By contrast, ten
states have eleven specific protections of privacy, five in freestanding
clauses, 80 and six by express language in search-and-seizure clauses. 81
Others, like the federal courts, have interpreted due process and natu71. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., inc., 473 U.S. 313 (1985).
72. See In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696 (fex. 1987).
73. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
74. See Darrin v. Gould, 540 P.2d 882 (Wash. 1975).
75. See Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
76. See Boren v. California Dept. of Employment Dev., 130 Cal. Rptr. 683 (Ct. App. 1976).
77. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976).
78. CAL. CoNsr. art. I, § 7(a), as amended by Proposition I (1979); see Crawford v. Board of
Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (upholding Proposition I).
79. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973).
.
80. See ALAsKA CoNsr. art. I,§ 22; CAL. CONsr. art. I,§ l; FLA. CoNsr. art. I,§ 23; HAW.
CoNsr. art. I, § 6; MONT. CoNsr. art. II, § 10.
81. ARIZ. CoNsr. art. II,§ 8; HAW. CoNsr. art. I,§ 7; ILL. CoNsr. art. I,§ 6; LA. CoNsr.
art. I, § 5; s.c. CoNsr. rut. I, § 10; wASH. CONsr. art. I, § 7.
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ral rights clauses to protect privacy. 82
State protection of privacy exceeds federal protection in many instances, such as a higher standard protecting a woman's right to
choose to terminate a pregnancy, 83 funding of abortions for poor women, 84 and recognition of gay marriage. 85 California, unlike the federal government, guarantees fundamental privacy protection against
private action. 86
C. Rights to Remedies and Rights of Victims, Rights "Unknown" to
the Federal Constitution
The Federal Constitution, with its Due Process Clause and its
Retention of Rights Clause, may someday include several new rights,
however unknown today. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that states explicitly protect rights that, unlike privacy, are at best on the fringes of
the Federal Constitution. Examples of these are a right to remedies
and victims' rights provisions.
Most state constitutions guarantee that their courts will be "open"
- a guarantee that courts frequently have construed to preserve common law remedies for injuries to persons. For example, a court held a
Texas statute limiting the award of damages to $500,000 for any medical malpractice injury, with the exception of necessary expenses for
treatment, unconstitutional under such a provision. 87 Another court
attempted to construe a right-to-remedy provision to strike down a
state governmental immunity provision. 88 The federal courts have not
made any similar decisions, and indeed, history counsels against such
a construction of at least the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 89
Finally, eleven states now have victims' rights provisions in their
state constitutions. 90 It is too early to know how significantly these
provisions will affect personal security, but nonetheless, their guaran82. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Greenberg v. Kim·
melman, 494 A.2d 294, 304 (N.J. 1985).
83. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1196 (Fla. 1989).
84. See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
85. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute discriminating against single-sex marriages).
86. See Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 627-28 (Ct. App.) (finding
that California law guarantees protection for privacy rights against intrusion by private actors,
unless the private actor can show a compelling interest), cert denied, 498 U.S. 939 (1990).
87. See Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (fex. 1988) (holding TEX. REV. C1V. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590i, §§ 11.02-.03 (Vernon Supp. 1986} unconstitutional under TEX. CONST. art I,
§ 13).
88. See Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495 (Mont. 1985), overruled by Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc,
776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989).
89. See David Schuman, Oregon's Remedy Guarantee: Article I, Section JO of the Oregon
Constitution, 65 OR. L. REv. 35, 39-40 (1986) (explaining that the suggested access·to-court
provisions in the Bill of Rights were never included).
90. See ARIZ. CoNST. art. II, § 2.1; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b);
ILL. CoNST. art. I, § 8.1; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 32; N.J. CoNST. art. 1,
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tee that victims may be present and heard in criminal proceedings and
California's guarantee of restitution may be sources of protection not
soon encompassed by the Federal Due Process Clause.
CONCLUSION: FOLLOWING THE MODERNIST MOSAIC FORM

It is not news for the Law Page of The New York Times that the
form of American fundamental law reflects the forms of Mosaic law
twenty-five hundred years ago and emulated first in Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania three hundred to three hundred and fifty years ago. It is
not news that there are basic national rights and broadly defined national values, and that within that framework states and communities
are free to enhance liberty. Perhaps it is news, however, that so much
of the enhancement of liberty is the handiwork of local groups, associations, and communities, and not the judiciary.
None of this should be especially surprising. As Leo Strauss
observed:
[K]nowledge of the indefinitely large variety of notions of right and
wrong is so far from being incompatible with the idea of natural right
that it is the essential condition for the emergence of that idea: realization of the variety of notions of right is the incentive for the quest for
natural right. 91

God etched fundamental law in stone. Moses broke the first set of
tablets. The second set disappeared. Then the people canonized the
varieties of fundamental law.
para. 22; N.M. CoNsr. art. II, § 24; R.I. CoNsr. art. I, § 23; TEX. CoNsr. art. I, § 30; wASH.
CoNsr. art. I, § 35.
91. LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HlSfORY 10 (1953), quoted in Robert P. George,
Natural Law and Civil Rights: From Jefferson's Letter to Henry Lee to Martin Luther King's
Letter from Birmingham Jail, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 143, 148 (1993); see Joseph Boyle, Natural
Law and the Ethics of Traditions, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 3 (Robert P. George ed., 1992).

